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In 1992, The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated a combat 
identification mission need statement. In support of the requirement for system 
interoperability, this thesis proposes a concept of operations for integrating two systems, 
Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) and the Enhanced Position Location 
Reporting System (EPLRS). 
SABER is a program initiated by Naval Space Command to provide real-time 
combat identification (CID) to the tactical user. It uses UHF satellite communications 
technology in conjunction with the Global Positioning System (GPS) to provide 
positioning information for up to 500 users. 
EPLRS is a situational awareness program used extensively by the U. S. Army to 
support tactical battlefield operations. In addition to providing automatic friendly 
identification of EPLRS-equipped units, it has a communications capability that allows 
for the passage of intelligence and targeting data, messages, and status reports. However, 
EPLRS operates in a line-of-sight mode only and uses military grid reference coordinates 
vice GPS for positional information. 
The integration of SABER and EPLRS has the potential to serve a major role in 
the armed services' common goal of reduced fratricide. This thesis gives a detailed 
description of both systems, examines their individual capabilities and limitations, 
discusses the ways in which the two systems complement each other, and provides a 
recommended integrated concept of operations. 
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Today's battles increasingly rely on long-range precision guided munitions, with 
the first combatant to fire often determining the outcome of an engagement. While our 
ability to shoot first from an over-the-horizon position has decreased the number of 
casualties suffered by our forces at the hands of the enemy, we must continue to find ways 
to reduce our number of friendly fire casualties. This need to reduce fratricide has led to 
the burgeoning field of combat identification (CID). This search for a solution to a 
battlefield combat identification problem that can be stated as follows: combat 
identification equals situational awareness plus target identification, or, CID = SA+ TID. 
[Ref 6]. Situational awareness encompasses the ability to precisely locate friendly forces 
with respect to each other and must be combined with friend or foe target identification to 
provide a solution for combat identification. The need for improved combat identification 
cannot be over-emphasized. The friendly fire casualties suffered during Operation 
DESERT STORM and the friendly forces shootdown of two Blackhawk helicopters 
during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT emphasize this need. 
In 1992, The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated a combat 
identification mission need statement comprised of three tiers. The first tier involves the 
identification of a unit as either friend, foe or neutral. The second tier expands this 
identification to include identification by platform, type/class and nationality. The third 
tier addresses interoperability, both joint service and allied. Joint Pub 0-1 defines 
interoperability as "the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept 
1 
services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together." When applied to communications-electronics 
systems, this definition is expanded to "the condition achieved among communications-
electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information 
or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users." 
[Ref 18, p. 110] 
While combat identification systems have long been under the purview of line-of-
sight communications systems, space systems have the ability to greatly improve the 
process of providing situational awareness to both warfighters and their warfare 
commanders. There are a variety of efforts being undertaken by all of the services to 
determine the best way to use our space assets to improve combat identification. The 
Joint Combat Identification Office stresses that while no one system can provide positive 
identification of friends, foes and neutrals across all environments, there is a definite need 
for joint service interoperability. 
One possible way to improve combat identification is to integrate the Navy's 
Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) system with the Army's Enhanced 
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). SABER is a program initiated by Naval 
Space Command to provide real-time situational awareness (SA) or combat identification 
(CID) to the tactical user. It uses UHF satellite communications technology in 
conjunction with the Global Positioning System (GPS) to provide positioning information 
for up to 500 users. EPLRS is a situational awareness program used extensively by the 
Army to support tactical battlefield operations. In addition to providing automatic friendly 
identification of EPLRS-equipped units, it has a communications capability that allows for 
2 
the passage of intelligence and targeting data, messages, and status reports. However, 
EPLRS operates in a line-of-sight mode only and uses military grid reference system 
(MGRS) coordinates vice GPS for positional information. The following chapters will 
give a detailed description of both systems, examine their individual capabilities and 
limitations, discuss the ways in which the two systems complement each other, and 
address how they can be integrated to best support the needs of the tactical user. 
3 
4 
II. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BEACON WITH 
REPLY (SABER) 
A. MISSION OVERVIEW 
SABER was conceived by the Navy as a means of meeting the requirement for 
over the horizon (OTH) surveillance of high value naval units and targets of interest. 
Requirements for space-based relay for aircrew rescue, combat identification and logistics 
tracking utilizing beacon technologies were added to the list of possible SABER uses. 
The feasibility of a space-based beacon locating concept was demonstrated during joint-
service testing in 1992. Following the downing of two United States Blackhawk 
helicopters during Operation PROVIDE PROMISE in April 1994, the Office of the Chief 
ofNaval Operations directed Naval Space Command to lead the development and testing 
of the SABER system. Additional testing has further demonstrated SABER's capability to 
serve as a near-term solution for friendly force situational awareness/combat identification 
requirements. 
SABER provides a space-based capability to locate and identify friendly forces 
utilizing Global Positioning System (GPS) positioning data. This positional information is 
combined with platform information and is disseminated to tactical units and global 
command and control nodes via UHF line-of-sight nodes and UHF satellite 
communications. This combination of friendly force situational awareness with 
identification of friendly combat assets directly supports the combat identification mission. 
SABER is based on the concept that fratricide will be greatly reduced if warfighters know 
their own positions, as well as their fellow war:fighters' positions, and can communicate 
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this information up the chain of command and to their allies. The SABER program has 
been divided into phases as summarized in Table 1. It is an ACAT II program with the 
Milestone II Review scheduled for the third quarter of FY97. [Ref 23] The current 
phase focuses on integrating SABER with EPLRS and demonstrating SABER's ability to 
utilize the Cobra waveform, a communications waveform that will improve SABER's low 
probability of intercept (LPI) capabilities. 
PHASE DATES PURPOSE/OUTCOME 
I Concept Formulation and MAR 94- 1. UHF chosen as the best frequency band for 
Development Planning JUL 94 relay of beacon data. 
2. GPS chosen for geolocation. 
3. Under the JROC cost constraint of $5,000, 
decided to design and manufacture a fully 
functional beacon. 
II Engineering AUG 94- 1. Continued feasibility tests. 
Demonstration Model NOV94 2. Concluded product surveys. 
Design 3. Began detailed design and engineering of 
hardware and software. 
4. Ended with a Preliminary Desian Review. 
Ill Fabrication of Engineering AUG 94- 1. Produced 5 SABER beacons. 
Prototype System MAY95 2. Produced 2 C2 terminals. 
Components and Field 3. Performed readiness testing of the EP 
Demonstration system. 
4. Conducted SABER technical evaluation. 
5. Prepared Demonstration Report. 
IV Design, Fabrication and MAR 95- 1. Conducted a Critical Design Review. 
Test of the Operational SEP 95 2. Prepared detailed design and engineering 
Demonstration (SABER-0) of hardware and software. 
System 3. Prepared an operator's manual. 
4. Constructed 27 beacons and an additional 
C2 terminal. 
5. Installed these beacons on 27 platforms. 
6. Participated in ASCIET 95. 
7. Conducted an acceptance test of SABER-
0. 
8. Prepared final demonstration report. 
v Follow-on Logistics SEP 95- 1. Deployed SABER beacons and terminals 
Support & Training for JUL 96 with MEU-22. 
Existing Beacons 
VI Cobra Waveform MAY 96- 1. Displayed integration with EPLRS in 
Demonstration and DEC96 ASCIET 96. 
EPLRS Integration 2. Cobra waveform demonstration scheduled 
for DEC 96. 
Table 1: SABER Development Phases [Ref. 21]. 
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B. COMPONENTS 
The SABER system is comprised of three segments; beacon, space and command 
and control, which are described below. 
1. Beacon Segment 
The beacon segment consists of a miniature UHF transceiver that is capable 
of both satellite communications (SATCOM) and line-of-sight (LOS) communications, a 
digital signal processor, an integrated commercial grade ("CA code") GPS receiver 
daughter board, a microprocessor, and a power management subsystem. 
The beacon assembly is contained in an electronics housing that is sealed to 
withstand dust and water immersion (up to one meter immersion for one hour). The entire 
beacon assembly measures 8" by 3.25" by 10 "and weighs eight pounds. It is intended to 
be rapidly installed in many types of platforms. The nominal temperature range is 0-50 
degrees Centigrade. The beacon periodically transmits the host platform's identification 
code, current location, altitude, speed over ground, course over ground, and time to the 
controller and all listening SABER beacons. The beacon is designed to support up to five 
simultaneous networks using a mix of SATCOM and LOS channels. The host platform 
must provide access to power and connections to GPS and UHF antennas. Figure 1 is a 
picture of a SABER beacon. 
UHF transceiver components include a radio frequency (RF) power 
amplifier, a transmit/receive switch, analog receiver and transmit/receive oscillators. The 
transceiver is capable of tuning 15,000 UHF frequencies in 5 kHz steps from 243.0 l\1Hz 
to 318.0 MHz. This range includes all available SATCOM uplink and downlink 
frequencies. It can also tune over 5000 discrete UHF LOS frequencies. The receiver has 
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a maximum noise figure of 2 dB. The first local oscillator is capable of binary phase shift 
keying (BPSK), shaped BPSK and frequency shift keying (FSK) modulation with a 
maximum rate of 9600 symbols per second. 
Connectors for. 
• Power 
• GPS Antenna 











Figure 1: SABER Beacon. [from Ref. 6] 
A microprocessor controls the digital signal processor (DSP) functions and 
schedules beacon operation. The DSP processes the transceiver signal for incoming and 
outgoing messages. It produces a shaped BPSK waveform that is transmitted using Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) techniques. Beacon operation, including assigned 
transmission interval and operating frequency, is normally scheduled via over-the-air 
commands by a network controller at a command and control (C2) node. A laptop 
computer acts as a simulated weapon system interface to the beacon, allowing the host 
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platform user to display situational awareness information, query other units for friendly 
identification and response, and manipulate beacon operating parameters. These computer 
display terminals (CDTs) allow operators to monitor and display reports from other 
SABER-equipped units. Figure 2 shows a sample SABER CDT. 
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,.AHEL (PtU.SE M 
Figure 2: SABER CDT. [From Ref. 7] 
2. Space Segment 
SABER uses existing space assets: 25 KHz and 5 KHz channels on Fleet 
Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM and UHF Follow-On (UFO)) spacecraft. The 
function of the space segment is to (I) relay beacon-originated messages to tactical/theater 
users and .MILSATCOM gateway nodes and (2) relay SABER cueing/reprogramming 
commands to beacon units. [Ref 6] The satellites used by SABER provide worldwide 
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coverage, except for the polar regions, and provide enhanced redundancy and endurability 
for the users. Figure 3 shows FLTSATCOM coverage. LOS transmissions are used to 

















LEASAT 2 (UFO 4) 
Figure 3: FLTSATCOM Coverage Area. [From Ref. 6] 
3. Command and Control (C2) Segment 
The C2 segment consists of fixed-site network management terminals. 
Each SABER network is associated with a separate satellite transponder and is managed 
by a separate network controller. The network controller schedules TDMA transmissions 
for all users on a given SABER network, displays user data on a TAC-3 or TAC-4 
computer, commands beacon operation over-the-air, polls units for individual immediate 
reports, and transmits new crypto or cipher keys to the beacons. The controller uses Navy 
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standard Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) software and 
translates/reformats SABER messages into the OTH-gold message format to transmit 
SABER data to other users through the OTCIXS network. Another translator reformats 
the data into the TADIL-J format for transmission to JTIDS/Link-16 users. 
C. CAP ABILITIES 
SABER can operate in one of two display modes - Local Situational Awareness 
(LSA) or Friendly Identification (FID). 
1. Local Situational Awareness (LSA) 
The LSA mode provides a "snapshot" of the battlefield. It allows the 
operator to observe all reporting SABER units within a specified range on a grid 
coordinate or latitude/longitude display. This matrix is overlaid with the current positions 
of the operator and all other SABER users reporting on the network. It shows the 
direction of travel of the host and the true bearing, range and direction of travel of all 
other displayed SABER reporters and can be configured to show line-of-sight situational 
awareness on a scalable display. Additional backup screens provide position, speed over 
ground, course over ground, true bearing and range, and identification of the displayed 
reporting units. LSA provides the operator immediate knowledge of his position and 
movement in three dimensional space and in relation to other SABER equipped units 
within LOS or SATCOM range. [Ref. 14] Figure 4 provides a sample LSA display. 
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Figure 4: LSA Display. [From Ref. 7] 
2. Friendly Identification (FID) 
The FID mode interrogates designated target locations to provide positive 
identification of friendly forces. It functions as an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) query 
and response system that polls SABER-equipped units to determine the location of 
friendlies in a specific geographic location. Figure 5 provides a sample FID display. 
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To use the FID mode, the user selects a weapon targeting point and radius 
of weapon lethality. He then sends an "Intent to Shoot" (ITS) message that is transmitted 
omnidirectioilally to all users within his LOS. Upon receiving an ITS message, a beacon 
compares its own location with the kill zone cited in the ITS. SABER-equipped friendly 
units within this zone respond with a "Don't Shoot Me" (DSM) message. Figure 6 depicts 
this ITS-DSM concept. DSM responses from units within and near the designated impact 
zone are displayed on the shooter's CDT as a friendly position location less than two 
seconds after the shooter has designated a target. This capability allows the user to 
positively ascertain the presence of friendly units in a targeted area prior to shooting and 
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can greatly improve the air-to-ground and ground-to-ground fire control problem, 




"I intend to shoot 
Posit X, Y measured 
@time Z" 
"DON'T SHOOT! 




Figure 6: FID DSM Concept. [from Ref. 8] 
3. Capacity 
Each individual beacon can operate concurrently on several different 
networks, such as a global situational awareness net, theater situational awareness net, 
"Don't Shoot Me" (DSM) net and up to eight theater LOS nets. 
Each 25KHz SATCOM network can support up to 500 position reports 
every two minutes. The structure is variable and can range from allowing 500 users one 
report every two minutes to allowing one user to report 500 times in two minutes. The 
network can be structured to provide a variety of reporting rates for a total of 60,000 
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position reports per hour. Each 5KHz SATCOM channel can support up to 150 reports 
every two minutes. 
Each theater LOS network can support up to 16 UHF LOS reports per 
second. Each user can display up to 200 simultaneous tracks. The battlefield commander 
can automatically monitor up to 15,000 platform positions per hour per net. Each beacon 
has a buffer capacity of8,464 records. [Ref. 14] 
4. Electronic Counter Countermeasures 
To mitigate the probability of the enemy exploiting and interfering with 
either direct or satellite-relayed beacon transmissions, SABER beacons use LPI burst 
message transmissions, embedded message enciphering and over-the-air cryptologic 
rekeying. Additionally, beacon units use 24-hour authentication and validation codes to 
alert other system users to the possibility that a unit has been captured. [Ref 6] 
D. OPERATIONAL FEATURES 
1. SABER Interfaces 
SABER messages are received by tactical terminals VIa LOS and 
SATCOM transmissions or via theater tactical dissemination broadcasts, including TRAP, 
OTCIXS and TADIL-J. The SABER command and control terminal (C2T) translates 
SABER reports to T ADIL-J format for Link 16 transmission or injection into the JTIDS 
network. Command and control gateway nodes also process beacon information for 
further dissemination via the Defense Data Network (DDN) and the Defense Information 
System Network (DISN), which provide the backbone for disseminating this information 
to global C2 systems, including JMCIS and GCCS. [Ref. 14] 
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2. Messages 
Each SABER message has a duration of 182 msec and is comprised of 16 
bytes: a three-byte header that specifies the message type and beacon identification code, 
a twelve-byte message, and a one-byte checksum that is calculated by XOR-ing the header 
and message bytes. [Ref 14] SABER message types include the following: 
• Position Report 
• Command Acknowledgement 
• Beacon Identification Code 
• Network Protocol Specification 
• Network Reporting Specification 
• RF Transmitter Specification 
• RF Transmitter Mute and Enable 
• Polling Request 
• Intent to Shoot Message 
• Don't Shoot Me Message 
• Network Cipher or Encryption Seed. 
3. TDMA Network Structure 
SABER uses Time Division Multiple Access to allow the C2 terminals to 
simultaneously track and control a number of beacons. The potential loss of positional 
data is minimized by designating beacon reporting times prior to operation. The SABER 
SATCOM protocol has a TDMA major frame of ten minutes. Each major frame is 
divided into 50 minor frames that are comprised of either twelve one-second slots or 24 
0.5-second slots, for a total of 600 one-second slots or 1200 0.5-second slots. There are 
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six major frames in an hour and 144 major frames in 24 hours. The data rate for 
SATCOM is 2400 symbols per second. [Refs. 14 & 24] 
The TDMA protocol for LOS communications consists of minor frames 
that are comprised of 24 slots each. The duration of a LOS slot is 500 msec, giving a total 
of 1200 slots per major frame. The data rate for LOS communications is 4800 symbols 
per second. 
The TDMA protocol for FID messages is similar to that used for 
SATCOM and LOS messages. Each FID minor frame is comprised of 12 slots of 500 
msec each. The slots are used as follows: 
Slot 1: Transmission of ITS command. 
Slot 2: Reserved for processing ITS message. 
Slots 3-12: Transmission ofDSM messages. 
E. SABER IMPROVEMENTS 
Follow-on versions of SABER, designated SABER-0.5 and SABER-I, will 
improve on the initial SABER-0 prototype. The upgraded versions will have an increased 
frequency range, added ECCM capabilities, increased maximum number of users and 
increased positional accuracy. Table 2 compares SABER-0, SABER-0.5 and SABER-I. 
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SPECIFICATION SABER-0 SABER-0.5 SABER-1 
Power 15-35 Vdc same with same with 
15 W receive enhanced power enhanced power 
200 W transmit management for management for 
manpack operation manQ_ack operation 
Frequencies 243-318 MHz 243-318 MHz 243-400 MHz 
ECCM Burst, FEC same plus COBRA same plus NSA 
waveform, certified crypto 
frequency agile 
Software displays JMCIS, Unified Build, same plus military same 
Military and and commercial 
Commercial maps at maps on COT and 
C2 Terminal TALON TAC-4 C2 
terminal 
Max Number of Users 
SATCOM: 3,000 positions/hour 15,000 15,000 
LOS: 6,000 positions/hour 15,000 60,000 
Transmission Interval Flexible, seconds to Flexible, as fast as Flexible, as fast as 
minutes 200 msec 200 msec 
SATCOM/LOS SATCOM, 50 msec 
LOS 
Temp_erature Range -5C to +SOC -15C to +65C TBD 
Output Signal Power 
Burst: 25W 25W 25W 
SATCOM: 750 msec 200 msec 200 msec 
LOS: 375 msec 200 msec 50 msec 
Transmitter TDMA with 1 sec Faster TDMA with TDMA with 200 
SATCOM timeslot and 200 msec msecSATCOM 
0.5 sec LOS slot; SA TCOM/LOS slot, slot, 50 msec LOS 
FDMA, 243-318 MHz COBRA waveform slot, COBRA 
waveform, 243-400 
MHz, FID Guard 
Receiver 
GPS Method CIA Code P(Y) Code P_(Y) Code 
Positional Accuracy 100m SEP <16m SEP when <16m SEP when 
ke_y_ed keyed 
Communication Ports RS-232 same plus KYK-13/ same plus MIL-
KOI-18 STD-1553B 
Table 2: Summary of SABER upgrades [After Ref. 13]. 
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III. ENHANCED POSITION LOCATION 
REPORTING SYSTEM (EPLRS) 
A. MISSION OVERVIEW 
1. System Description 
The Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) is one 
element of the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS). EPLRS supports tactical 
operations on the battlefield using a reliable digital data communications system to link 
mobile battlefield elements to higher echelons of command. Its capabilities include 
automatic position location, reporting, friendly identification, and navigation. The 
positions of units equipped with EPLRS are known and available to authorized individual 
users and to command and control facilities, allowing for quick identification of friendly 
units and greatly reducing the probability of fratricide. The system allows the passage of 
targeting data, combat orders, situational reports (SITREPS), intelligence data, and 
messages without taxing other operational communications links. It allows adjacent 
fighting elements, even in different organizations, to "see" and communicate directly with 
each other. 
2. Capabilities 
The various capabilities of EPLRS enable it to be utilized in support of all 
five nusston areas of the battlefield: maneuver control, fire support, air defense, 
intelligence/electronic warfare and combat service support. [Ref 2] 
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a. Maneuver Control 
Unit identification, position location and unit operational status can 
be distributed to command and control centers, giving the commander a snapshot of the 
forces and assisting in decisions to deploy and maneuver these forces. 
b. Fire Support 
EPLRS benefits the fire support mission by distributing artillery fire 
requests and mission support data simultaneously to multiple destinations. An artillery 
request initiated by a forward observer can be automatically routed to the fire support 
team, fire direction center, fire support officer and the battery computer system, enhancing 
mission processing and improving response times while reducing operator workload and 
transmission error. 
c. Air Defense 
EPLRS provides reliable communications to support the timely 
distribution of command and control data and the exchange of air track data, provides data 
communications for air tracks from sensors to fire units, and can provide sensor netting 
communications. 
d Intelligence/Electronic Warfare 
EPLRS supports the intelligence/electronic warfare rmsston by 
allowing the rapid collection of data from widely dispersed systems in the forward battle 
areas, processing it, then disseminating the data back to the deployed forces. The system 
automatically reconfigures itself to overcome line-of-sight limitations and jamming and 
allows the commander to modify the network to accommodate tactical deployment 
changes. 
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e. Combat Service Support 
Logistics support operations are greatly enhanced by the position 
location/reporting navigation functions of the system. The efficiency of coordinating 
medical evacuations, convoy control and emergency repairs of disabled vehicles is 
improved by the features of this system. 
B. COMPONENTS 
The two primary equipment elements are the Network Control Station (NCS) and 
the Radio Set (RS). 
1. Network Control Station 
The NCS is the focal point for automated technical control and centralized 
management of an EPLRS network comprised of up to 400 radio sets. It is operated by 
the signal battalion within the division and provides dynamic network management, 
automatic processing of position, navigation and identification, responses to information 
requests from participating users, and a real time display and control capability. It 
provides the control functions necessary for user-to-user communications, including 
assignment of timeslot and frequency resources, establishes and maintains EPLRS control 
and communications networks, and monitors and reports systems performance 
information. It activates/deactivates permanent virtual circuits, or needlines, provides 
over-the-air rekeying (OTAR) of cryptographic variables and acts as an alternate NCS for 
adjacent EPLRS communities. Each NCS is linked to an Army command and control 
center via a duplex communications circuit and to two alternate NCSs via a 160 bps 
duplex needline. The NCS requires an input power of approximately 15 Kilowatts at 120 
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V AC, 60 Hz which can come from either facility house power or an external generator. 
[Ref. 2] 
Currently, the NCS is a fully militarized shelter which is mounted on a five~ 
ton vehicle. Figure 7 is a picture of an NCS. The layout of the NCS provides space for 
the equipment as well as the operator and two additional personnel. The equipment suite 
includes one AN/UYK-7 and three ANIUYK~44 computers, a Display Control Station 
with a 22-inch display, an Enhanced Command Response Unit (ECRU), crypto control 
unit, cartridge magnetic tape unit, and an AN/UGC-74. A downsized, lighter weight 
version that can be mounted on a highly mobile multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) 
is under development. 
Figure 7: EPLRS Net Control Station. [from Ref. 3] 
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2. Radio Set 
The RS can be configured as a manpack, for vehicular mount or for 
aircraft. It is a transceiver that reports the identification of other RSs with which it can 
communicate, provides a barometric transducer reading, has two interfaces (user and 
computer), operates as a relay and provides data for the NCS to use in computing position 
and navigation information. [Ref. 2] 
The basic unit has dimensions of 5.1 inches by 10.5 inches by 14.7 inches 
and weighs 28 pounds, allowing for manpack operation in a rugged tactical environment. 
The same basic unit is used in all configurations, but the battery box is replaced with a 
Selectable Power Adapter (SPA) for vehicles or an Airborne Power Adapter (AP A) for 
use in aircraft. The host interface configuration is either ADDS! or MIL-STD-1553B. 
The MIL-STD-1553B interface will be used in airborne and some vehicle applications. It 
transfers user information in host packets containing up to 60 bytes (480 bits). The 
ADDS! is designed for emerging and future battlefield automation systems. It transfers 
user information in host packets containing up to 128 bytes (1024 bits). Figure 8 depicts a 
radio set. 
The RS uses spread spectrum and TDMA technology. The EPLRS TDMA 
architecture uses 512 time slots per second. The current radio can transmit or receive a 
fully encrypted packet of 80 user bits in a single time slot. It is a line-of-sight radio that 
operates on one of eight predesignated frequencies in the 420-450 MHz range. The RS 
can transmit on any combination of these frequencies or can frequency hop across all of 
them. It operates on 28 volts direct current which can come from either a battery, a 
vehicle alternator, or 11 0-120 volts alternating current. [Ref 2] 
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ANTENNA 
ENHANCED PLRS _ __,_., 
RADIO SET (RS) 
PRIME POWER 28 VDC 
16 WAITS 
WEIGHT 
• EPLRS RIT 17 LBS 
• TOTAL RS 28 LBS 
(AS SHOWN INCLUDES BATTERY BOX WITH 2 BATTERIES) 
HOST INTERFACE DATA PORT 
/
(ADDSI OR 1553B) 
BATTERY BOX 
-~ .... -. 
RS DIMENSIONS 
• HEIGHT 5.1" 
• WIDTH 10.5" 
• DEPTH 14.7" 
(INCLUDES BATTERY BOX) 
Figure 8: EPLRS Radio Set. [from Ref. 3) 
C. CAP ABILITIES 
1. Position Location 
EPLRS computes user position location by multilateration. This method 
requires that range vectors be determined from at least three known RS locations to locate 
another RS whose position location is unknown. EPLRS determines these ranges by 
measuring the time-of-arrival (TOA) of RF bursts from the RS as received by the other 
RSs. Since the transmission times are precisely known, the TOA is a direct reflection of 
the path length between transmitting and receiving RSs. The multilateration then uses 
these ranges to calculate the position. 
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The data provided in response to an operator's request for his own location 
uses Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) coordinates, with distance given in meters 
and bearing given in degrees. Typical accuracy is within a 15 meter Circular Error 
Probable (CEP). An operator can also request the location of another EPLRS-equipped 
unit or any of up to 104 Predesignated Items (PDis). The operator can then receive either 
an MGRS coordinate or a bearing/range to the RS or PDI location. Requests for position 
location information can be updated automatically or provided on a one-time as requested 
basis. 
EPLRS is designed so that the NCS operator can authorize any user one-
time access to a particular service request or alter the user's library to allow permanent 
access to an NCS service message net. This provides flexibility to allow for the loss of a 
unit and the reassignment of another RS in its place. Any RS authorization can be quickly 
modified by the NCS operator to allow access as needed. Position location accuracy for 
the various radio sets is summarized in Table 3. 
Radio Set Type X, Y Absolute Z Absolute Altitude Radio Set 
Horizontal Position Accuracy (AEP) Deployment 
Accuracy (CEP) 
Man pack 1 0 - 30 meters 1 0 - 30 meters Primary Operating 
Area (47 X 47 Km) 
Surface Vehicles 1 0 - 30 meters 1 0 - 30 meters Primary Operating 
Area (47 X 47 Km) 
Airborne 25 - 1 00 meters 1 0 - 30 meters Primary Operating 
(all platforms) Area(47 X 47 Km) 
Airborne 1 00 - 200 meters 15 - 90 meters Extended Operating 
(all platforms) Area (300 X 300 Km) 
Table 3: Position Location Accuracy for Radio Set Types [From Ref. 3]. 
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2. Identification 
A significant feature of EPLRS is its capability to identify individual users. 
Two different identification service requests are available to the user. The identification, 
or "I", type provides the unit's military identification (MILID) or name. It is used for 
verification purposes on the part of the user or when a unit in the system does not have an 
ID. The who, or "W", type provides the identity of unknown units. The user sends to the 
NCS either the MGR or the estimated bearing and range of the unknown unit. The NCS 
will then send the military ID of the unit in question to the requesting RS . 
This identification capability can be used by a local security outpost to 
verify the identity of a returning reconnaissance patrol or by an artillery observer to 
request information about an unidentified unit. The RS equipped units also have an 
Identification Friend/Foe (IFF) capability (in addition to traditional IFF techniques). 
3. Navigation Aids (NA V AIDS) 
NA V AIDS provide users important information and guidance m 
performing their missions. Information that can be requested from the NCS includes: 
• bearing and range to an RS or a location identified as a grid coordinate 
• guidance to and through a lane (a two-dimensional ground-based 
region defined by a series of linear segments) 
• guidance to and through a corridor (a three-dimensional region defined 
with up to five legs used to provide airborne users with automatic one-
way guidance over a predetermined course) 
• guidance around a zone (a dimensional region having up to six sides 
used to indicate a restricted area) 
• own or another RS's heading and speed 
• own or another RS's position 
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• MGRS coordinates or bearing/range ofPDis. 
4. Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) 
EPLRS resists enemy jamming by using a variety of waveform design and 
signal processing techniques, relatively high values of effective radiated power (ERP) and 
a number of other factors such as automatic network configuration and path redundance. 
ECCM techniques used by EPLRS include burst transmission, spread spectrum, integral 
relay, error control and signal encryption. Its relay capability allows reliable radio 
coverage over large deployment areas with little prior relay planning. The system 
automatically selects a good relay path under conditions of rough terrain, limited line-of-
sight or enemy jamming. [Ref. 3] 
5. Capacity 
Communication capacity at the network level is defined in terms of 
throughput and depends on the number ofRSs in the network. For example, a network of 
250 RSs comprised of 25% simplex and 75% duplex communications has a practical 
capacity of 180 Kbps. Needline and RS capacities are defined by their highest throughput. 
Group addressed needlines can support data rates up to 1200 bps; duplex needlines can 
support up to 600 bps. RS capacity for an individual duplex circuit is 640 bps for 
transmission or reception; group capacity on an individual circuit is 1280 bps. 
D. OPERATIONAL FEATURES 
1. Systems Control (SYSCON) 
The EPLRS SYSCON is the operational focal point and technical 
controller of the multiple NCS community [Ref 2 p. 14] and interfaces with higher level 
Information Systems Controls (ISYSCON). The ISYSCON ensures that the NCSs 
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operate in concert with each other. Major system control functions handled by the 
ISYSCON include "time and frequency resource allocation, time synchronization, crypto-
key usage, CONOPS, communications with multiple NCS communities and the common 
library of units, needlines and NAY AIDS." [Ref. 2 p. 15] ISYSCON is responsible for 
providing the user community with the information necessary to utilize the system to its 
maximum potential and coordinates data transfer from each NCS to the users. Updated 
position, identification, NA V AID and needline information is provided over a group-
addressed needline to a variety of host systems, including MCS and FAAD C2I. 
2. Needline activation 
EPLRS needlines define which units exchange information, the data rate 
and priority of the exchange, and whether or not acknowledgement is required. Needline 
activation establishes data communications between two RSs or between an RS and 
multiple RSs (group-addressed). Needlines are assigned by the NCS and are activated by 
the user. User-to-user communication is established when a path is found and relay 
assignments are accepted by all RSs on the communication path. 
3. Communications 
EPLRS supports the near-term data requirements for the ADDS through a 
combination of duplex and group addressed communications using host-to-host (RS-to-
RS) and free text message format. For host-to-host communications, needlines and 
needline parameters must be established prior to operations. User-to-user data 
communications over the control network requires no specific planning. An EPLRS 
communications circuit is a permanent virtual circuit between two or more RSs. For 
duplex needlines, the NCS assigns resources to support source and destination RSs. For 
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group addressed needlines, the NCS assigns specific resources to support a source RS and 
one or more destination RSs. The number of destination RSs is limited to 100 for group 
addressed needlines. 
Both types of circuits use a second source receive technique by which a set 
of timeslots is assigned for all relays and destination RSs to listen for the transmissions 
through the chain. Using this technique, a final destination is able to hear a source 
transmission directly vice waiting for a relay. The redundancy provided by the automatic 
retransmission by the relay unit increases the probability of the final destination receiving 
the message. 
4. Data delivery 
ADDSI host packets or 1553B data blocks are converted by the RS into 
transmission units (TU s) containing 80 information bits each. The TU s are transported 
between source and destination RSs through the EPLRS communications network via 
needlines. The TUs are converted back to ADDSI packets or 1553B blocks at the 
destination RS. An ADDS! host can exchange data with a 1553B host as long as the 
information field formats are compatible. 
5. Free Text Messages 
The five categories of free text messages, distinguished by destination and 
delivery method are: 
• F: messages between NCS and RS. These are ten character free text 
messages sent by the RS to the NCS and stored at the NCS. 
• G: messages to the command and control center. The messages are 
automatically forwarded to the C2 center with the NCS functioning as 
a store and forward message switch. 
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• RIQ: messages between RSs via the NCS. R-type messages include 
the MILID of the destination unit. Each unit can predesignate a 
destination unit to automatically receive all Q-type messages from the 
originating unit. Each unit may be designated to receive Q messages 
from multiple other RSs. 
• S: messages between RSs over a local subnet. Local subnets are 
independent of the control and communications networks and the NCS. 
They provide a faster and more reliable means of exchanging data 
across NCS community boundaries. Local subnets reduce the amount 
of traffic on the network control and provide faster response times than 
RIQ messages. However, they are limited to only one level of relay 
and only RSs assigned to the same local subnet will relay for each 
other. 
• Notices: messages controlled and distributed by the NCS. These may 
be entered into the system or modified by any authorized unit. They 
are used for such things as weather prediction updates, alert level 
changes and mission status. 
E. CURRENT STATUS 
1. Basis of Issue 
The current Basis of Issue authorizes 1816 Radio Sets, 23 Net Control 
Stations and 23 EPLRS Grid Reference Units. An additional 2107 RSs were authorized 
by the Army Acquisition Executive in September 1995. A "bridge" contract for 300 
additional RSs was awarded 24 January 1996. EPLRS is currently fielded to the First 
Cavalry Division and to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). [Ref 4] 
2. Battlefield Information Transmission System (BITS) 
BITS is a direct outgrowth of the Army Digitization Master Plan (ADMP), 
which describes the process that will lead to seamless interoperability across the 
battlefield, the capability required to transform the Army into a 21st century force (Force 
XXI). [Ref 5 p. 1] The goal ofBITS is to develop a system that will exceed the current 
combined capacities of EPLRS and two other legacy systems, the Single Channel Ground 
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and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) 
Tactical Packet Network (TPN). These three systems will form a Tactical Internet (TI) 
that will be "intemetworked through the use of gateways to form a complete, seamless 
system for the brigade task force, division and corps AWEs." [Ref 5 p. 5] BITS will use 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology to increase throughput and 
interoperability and will connect to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). 
The Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR) is the initial BITS strategy to 
provide a system more capable but less expensive than EPLRS. The goal is to have a high 
data rate waveform that provides higher throughput than EPLRS. The far-term strategy 
includes experimentation with a prototype Future Digital Radio (FDR) and Wideband HF 




IV. OTHER SYSTEMS 
There are a number of other situational awareness and combat identification 
systems currently in use or under development by the various services. This chapter 
briefly describes several such systems. 
A. JOINT MARITIME COMMAND INFORMATION SYSTEM 
(JMCIS) 
The Joint Maritime Command Information System was first conceptualized by 
SPAW AR PD60 in 1986. It has evolved to a system that uses the same software as the 
basis for both afloat and ashore communications. It is designed to provide a common 
operating environment (COE) for a core set of functions including track management, 
correlation, communications and tactical display components. This common software 
core is designed to provide standardization, increase interoperability, reduce training, and 
ensure that diverse systems providing the same function provide the same answers. 
JMCIS uses a client/server architecture in which clients establish a connection to and 
request services from a server and receive results back across the established connection. 
JMCIS is comprised of eight core services: Alerts, Chart, Communications, File 
Management, Menu, Miscellaneous, Security and Track Management. Combat 
identification is primarily involved with the chart, communications and track management 
services. The chart service creates and manages tactical geographic displays. The 
communications service receives and processes mcommg messages. The track 
management service includes basic track management, multiple track types, track 
correlation, and a track history archive. Tactical decision aids (TDAs) provided by JMCIS 
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include coordinate conversion, closest point of approach calculations, search and rescue 
pattern development, satellite database, satellite vulnerability calculations, status boards of 
selected tracks, and track history analysis. [Ref. 25] 
B. GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (GCCS) 
The Global Command and Control System is a highly mobile, deployable C2 
system that will provide the Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS) and Commanders in Chief(CINCs) 
with compatible, interoperable, and integrated C4I systems. It is designed to meet the C2 
requirements of the National Command Authorities through the Joint Task Force 
Commander. The objective ofGCCS is to provide the warfighter with the tools needed to 
accomplish his mission and the operational commander with the C2 system needed for the 
21st century. It integrates tactical, theater and national intelligence from other C4I 
systems into a fused, common picture of the warfighter's battlespace. GCCS will 
essentially provide the backbone for all military and government communications traffic 
worldwide. [Ref. 22] 
C. COMBAT TRACK 
Combat Track is a program under development by the U. S. Air Force to provide 
enroute situational awareness of aircraft and logistics tracking. Combat Track uses 
military controlled relay satellites, the Global Positioning System and RF-tagged cargo 
pallets to provide position information, two-way message text, load plans and cargo 
information to users and control nodes. Data is relayed via encrypted UHF burst 
transmissions. Its TDMA structure supports up to 30 users with 10-second reporting 
slots and up to 900 users with a 5-minute reporting cycle. Combat Track is designed to be 
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compatible with the Army's Battlefield Distribution System. Its hardware includes a 
COTS laptop computer, transceiver, processor, SATCOM antenna, GPS antenna and an 
antenna interface. It is designed to be flown on any aircraft capable of being fitted with 
SATCOM and GPS antennas. [Ref 26] 
D. POSITION LOCATION REPORTING SYSTEM (PLRS) 
The Position Location Reporting System has been used by the Marine ~orps since 
1987 as a means for a commander to monitor the movement of his maneuvering forces. It 
was designed to provide timely and accurate three dimensional positioning information, 
navigational assistance to friendly forces, coordinated fire and air support, and control and 
maneuver of ground and air units. Its major elements are master stations and user units. 
User units can be installed in aircraft, surface vehicles or manpacks. Like EPLRS, 
position location is computed using multilateration and is reported in MGRS coordinates. 
PLRS is a synchronous TDMA system that has a 64 second epoch as its longest user 
reporting period and a quarter-second frame as its shortest user reporting period. Each 
epoch is comprised of256 frames; each frame is comprised of 128 timeslots; each timeslot 
is comprised of2 msec. Its operating frequency is 420-450 MHz. For ECCM, PLRS uses 
spread spectrum, frequency hopping, error detection and correction and automatic relay. 
Its position accuracy is 15 meters CEP. [Ref 27] 
PLRS is being upgraded through the PLRS Communications Enhancement (PCE) 
program. This program is designed to provide Marine Corps units additional 
communications capability in support of current operations and emerging tactical systems. 
The PCE program will exploit the existing PLRS relay structure by providing several types 
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of communications service for a variety of tactical operations. It will also enhance the 
interoperability of PLRS and EPLRS by providing mutual relay support for EPLRS 
needlines. 
Tests conducted on the USS ESSEX have demonstrated the capability to integrate 
PLRS with JMCIS to relay position locations and tracks of amphibious units to other ships 
and shore-based C2 nodes. [Ref 19] The systems were integrated with a hard 
connection between the Navy Tactical Command System - Afloat (NTCS-A) and an 
AN/K.SQ-1 amphibious assault direction finding system equipped with a GPS interface 
unit. The GPS interface unit allows AN/K.SQ-1 platforms to transmit GPS data to a local 
workstation that reformats the position information from latitude/longitude to MGRS 
coordinates for retransmission to the PLRS master station. AN/KSQ-1 Block 1 is an 
upgrade planned for FY97 to completely integrate PLRS with JMCIS, enabling all ships in 
a task force to receive the PLRS-derived position location information. 
E. GRENADIER BRAT 
Grenadier Brat is an Army TENCAP initiative to produce a small, low power, 
LOS/SATCOM capable reporting beacon that uses GPS for position location and the 
Cobra waveform for communications. It provides LPIILPD, one-way communications 
from its beacons to its C2 terminal. As of August 96, Grenadier Brat was the only 
situational awareness system with the Cobra waveform. [Ref 21] 
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V. PROGRAM DEMONSTRATIONS 
A. ALL SERVICE COMBAT IDENTIFICATION TEAM 1995 
(ASCIET 95) 
SABER was evaluated as part of the ASCIET 95 assessment of combat 
identification systems as directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). 
The evaluations were conducted 27 August 1995 to 17 September 1995 with the support 
of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) and various operational units 
at Eglin AFB, FL. The purpose of ASCIET is to examine current multi-service combat 
identification procedures and capabilities on the battlefield and to identify possible changes 
to systems, interoperability issues, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. The 
findings and recommendations of ASCIET are included in the General Officer Steering 
Group - Combat Identification (GOSG-CID) annual report to the JROC and 
Commanders-in-Chief [Ref 9] 
1. ASCIET 95 Goals 
The goals of SABER's participation in ASCIET 95 included: 
• Demonstrate how timely utilization of SABER-derived information can 
increase friendly force situational awareness prior to an engagement. 
• Demonstrate the capability to decrease the incidence of fratricide when 
SABER-derived information is used. 
• Demonstrate increased situational awareness by theater level operators 
when using SABER. 
• Compare SABER's responses with those provided by other combat 
identification programs. 
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2. Positive findings 
Naval Space Command concluded that SABER's potential value in the 
prevention of fratricide and command and control of forces was clearly demonstrated in 
ASCIET 95. They concluded that SABER "provided improved situational awareness for 
the warfighter and the battleforce commander, it mitigated fratricide through knowledge 
of the battlespace and FID, and the system proved itself to be sufficiently mature for an 
extended operational evaluation." [Ref 14] Their findings included: 
• SABER accuracy was within 1 00 meters for latitude/longitude and 100 
meters for altitude. 
• SABER navigated over 95 percent of the time and communicated over 
98 percent of the time over operational routes that included open areas, 
heavy foliage and urban environments. 
• The SABER C2 terminal was able to display and distinguish two 
beacon-equipped platforms separated by as little as 10 meters. 
• Response time from ITS to DSM was 1 to 6 seconds using half-duplex 
communications. 
3. Negative findings 
Shortcomings identified during ASCIET 95 included: 
• OTCIXS cannot support the additional reporting required to support 
the SABER 
• The prototype beacon cannot support more than 1 00 beacons when 
reporting of more than once per minute via LOS or once per 5 minutes 
via SATCOM is required. 
• When providing situational awareness and control functions, a single 
transceiver provide insufficient resources for an FID net. 
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B. 22 MEU DEPLOYMENT 
A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is an amphibious readiness force that is 
prepared for employment across a wide spectrum of operational and crisis situations. 
Naval Space Command deployed a SABER system with the Twenty-Second Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (22 :MEU) to the Mediterranean Ocean 27 January 1996. The system 
deployed included one C2 terminal located on the USS GUAM, eighteen SABER beacons 
mounted on various tactical vehicles and aircraft and one manpack. SABER was deployed 
with 22 :MEU to provide feedback on the merits of SABER technology and to verify its 
utility to Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group operations. [Ref. 29] 
1. 22 MEU Goals 
The goals of this SABER deployment included [Ref 29]: 
• Determining if SABER improves friendly force situational awareness 
for the warfighter. 
• Determining if SABER does indeed demonstrate a feasible approach to 
mitigating the combat fratricide problem. 
• Determining if SABER is sufficiently mature to support expanded use 
by operational forces. 
2. Positive Findings 
22 :MEU reported that "overall, SABER performed as advertised 
throughout the deployment, contributing significantly to the improved situational 
awareness of the MEU commander and his staff" [ Ref. 15]. Specific findings included: 
• SABER was seamlessly integrated into the C2 architecture of22 :MEU, 
the George Washington battlegroup, Sixth Fleet and EUCOM. 
• The system possesses the fundamental characteristics that will enable it 
to be integrated into tactical communications. 
• The system was easy to mount and install on a variety of platforms. 
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3. Negative Findings 
22 .MEV reported that a troubling aspect of SABER is its reliance on 
SATCOM. They were unable to secure a dedicated SAT COM channel for any of the 
scheduled exercises or real world operations. While the system functioned properly in the 
UHF LOS mode, a lack of available SATCOM channels made it difficult to meet the needs 
of the operational commander during over-the-horizon operations. [Ref 15] 
C. ALL SERVICE COMBAT IDENTIFICATION TEAM 1996 
(ASCIET 96) 
SABER was tested in ASCIET 96 as an "off-line" system, meaning that the 
ASCIET staff was not formally involved in its assessment and that SABER testing would 
be conducted on a not-to-interfere basis with the "on-line" activities. The same SABER-0 
beacons that were used for ASCIET 95 and the 22 MEU deployment were also used for 
ASCIET 96. In addition to verifying results obtained from previous SABER 
demonstrations, ASCIET 96 was used to assess the interoperability of SABER with 
EPLRS and Grenadier Brat. [Ref 21] 
The SABER network consisted of a control tower with C2T controllers for both 
LOS and SATCOM networks, a repeater and nine ground beacons. The EPLRS net 
consisted of an NCS, several reference stations and approximately 140 RSs. 
Approximately 24 Grenadier Brat beacons were used, four of which were collocated with 
SABER beacons. Connectivity between SABER and EPLRS was achieved by establishing 
a needline from an EPLRS RS located in the SABER control center to the EPLRS NCS. 
An EPLRS Situational Awareness Terminal (SAT) was used as a gateway between 
EPLRS and SABER An RS-232 serial link connected the EPLRS SAT and SABER C2T 
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to bring EPLRS platforms into the SABER net and pass SABER/Grenadier Brat positions 
to EPLRS. A closely related off-line study linked EPLRS-equipped F-16s to the EPLRS 
net via SADL. 
1. ASCIET 96 Goals 
Goals for SABER in ASCIET 96 included the following [Ref. 21] : 
• Determine if SABER provides improved SA for the warfighter. 
• Determine if SABER demonstrates a feasible approach to mitigating 
the combat fratricide problem. 
• Determine if SABER is sufficiently mature for an extended operational 
evaluation. 
• Determine if SABER data can be fused with information from other C2 
sources to form a common operational picture for the warfighter. 
2. Positive Findings 
Naval Space Command found that "functionally the 
SABERIEPLRS/Grenadier Brat Common Operating Picture was a success." [Ref. 21] 
ASCIET 96 confirmed the position location accuracy displayed in ASCIET 95. 
Additional positive findings of ASCIET 96 were: 
• SABER demonstrated capability to generate six reports per mmor 
frame over the 25kHz SATCOM channel. 
• The SABER C2T demonstrated the ability to display relative position 
and spatial separation of beacons on various digital map displays. 
• SABER successfully activated pre-programmed missions, 
reprogrammed beacon configuration and commanded beacons through 
both the 25 kHz UHF SATCOM net and the LOS net. 
• The SABER C2T demonstrated the ability to actively display 70-80 
SABERIEPLRS/Grenadier Brat tracks (a number three times that 
previously tested). 
41 
• SABER demonstrated connectivity to SIPRNET, OTCIXS, JTIDS and 
EPLRS. 
• SABER data broadcast on the EPLRS net, fused with EPLRS and 
displayed on the EPLRS SAT was accurate and timely. 
• The ability to have SABER/EPLRS positions sent/received via SADL 
to the F -16 was confirmed. 
• The ability to fuse EPLRS data pulled from the EPLRS net with 
SABER and display it on the SABER C2T was confirmed. 
• The ability to send Cobra data from the Grenadier Brat C2T to the 
SABER C2T was confirmed. 
3. Negative Findings 
Several areas that still require refinement were identified [Ref 21]: 
• SABER has a sensitivity problem with the 5kHz SATCOM channel in 
a strong RF environment. Local RFI and high power users can knock 
SABER off this channel. 
• Since no SABER C2T controller owns the entire capability of a 
beacon, it is not possible to use one net to change the program of a 
LOS net on a beacon that is not accessible to its LOS controller. 
• The CDTs used for ASCIET 96 are not suitable for operational 
environments. 
• A large number of EPLRS position reports sent from the SAT to the 
SABER C2T were lost, resulting in poor timeliness. 
• Grenadier Brat position reports sent to the SABER C2T were 20-25 
seconds time-late. 
• EPLRS data rebroadcast on the SABER net, fused with SABER data 
and displayed to the SABER C2T in LSA mode experienced a 
significant time-lag. 
• Grenadier Brat data rebroadcast on the SABER net, fused with 
SABER data and displayed to the SABER C2T in LSA mode 
experienced a significant time-lag. 
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D. JOINT WARRIOR INTEROPERABILITY DEMONSTRATION 
1996 ( JWID 96) 
JWID 96 was also conducted in August 1996. The exerctse focused on 
demonstrating the capability to provide a real-time, single picture common operating 
environment to the warfighter using a low cost system. The exercise demonstrated the 
capability to inject position location information PLRS and EPLRS-equipped units into 
GCCS and JMCIS using EHF communications via the MILST AR satellite system. 
Additionally, EPLRS tracks were simultaneously transmitted to an Air Force controller to 
provide near-real-time situational awareness to pilots flying close air support. [Ref 28] 
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VI. PROPOSED CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS 
A. COMPARISON OF SABER AND EPLRS CHARACTERISTICS 
Before looking at possible architectures for integrating SABER and EPLRS, it is 
important to understand the programs' similarities and differences. SABER is designed to 
provide a quick snapshot of the battlefield to the tactical user. EPLRS is a legacy system 
designed to provide tactical situational awareness as well as to provide real-time 
communications between tactical users operating within a common area. Both SABER 
and EPLRS are relatively lightweight, transmit over similar frequencies using similar 
ECCM techniques, and provide comparable position location accuracies. However, the 
systems use different position location methods and coordinate systems, and have different 
transmission time intervals. Additionally, there is a significant difference in the projected 
costs of the systems. The projected cost of a SABER beacon is $5K while the projected 
cost of an EPLRS radio set is $30-40K. [Ref 13] Table 4 summarizes the similarities 
and differences of the two programs. 
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SPECIFICATION SABER-1 EPLRS 
Electrical Voltage 18-35 Vdc, 15W receive, 200 W 28 Vdc, 16W 
transmit, plus enhanced power 
management for man _pack 
Radio Size 8 pounds Radio Set: 17 pounds 
Total RS (battery, antenna, 
display): 28 pounds 
Length: 8 inches Length: 14.7 inches 
Width: 1 0 inches Width: 10.5 inches 
Height: 3 inches Height: 5.1 inches 
Antenna Type SA TCOM/LOS: Monopole, LOS: Monopole 
Crossed Dipole GPS: 3" 
diameter active patch 
Frequencies UHF 243-400 MHz UHF 420-450 MHz 
ECCM Burst, FEC, COBRA waveform, Spread spectrum, frequency 
frequency agile, NSA certified hopping, error detection and 
cry_pto correction 
Position Display on User identification, latitude, MGRS (text only) 
Vehicle longitude, altitude, COG, SOG 
Data Distribution JTIDS, Link 16, OTCIXS, Integrated Communication System 
OTHGOLD, TRAP Controller, STDN-4, SCAMP, Link 
4A, Link 11, Link 16 
Software Diplays JMCIS, Unified Build, Military Network situational awareness at 
and commercial maps at C2T, NCS, JMCIS display via PUS 
COT and TALON TAC-4 C2 
Terminal 
Integrated with and JMCIS, GCCS, OTCIXS, TRAP, IVIS, SINGCARS, JMCIS, SADL 
Displays Tracks On T AC-3 C2 compatible and 
interoperable 
Maximum Number 15,000 position updates per hour 250 radio sets and 1 NCS per 
of Users SATCOM, 60,000 per hour LOS, brigade area, potential of up to 460 
10 networks RSs 
Transmission Flexible, as fast as 200 msec Controlled by NCS based on rate of 
Interval SA TCOM, 50 msec LOS movement, as fast as 250 msec 
Time Delays Real-time updates via Info requests granted as fast as 1 
SATCOM/LOS sec 
Modulation BPSK, FEC coded 256-bit burst Spread spectrum, frequency 
transmission (128 info bits), hopping, 94-bit burst transmission 
COBRA waveform {80 info bits) 
Position Accuracy <16m SEP when keyed 15m CEP 
and Method GPS P(Y) Code Multilateration 
Communication RS-232, KYK-13/KOI-18, MIL- X.25, MIL-STD-1553B 
Ports STD-1553B 
Table 4: SABERJEPLRS Comparison Matrix [Ref. 13]. 
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B. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS 
The goal of integrating SABER and EPLRS is to provide a common operating 
picture to all warfighters. Any integration plan will require modifications to both systems. 
Items that must be considered are the position location method and reporting system used, 
reporting architectures, and overall connectivity. The following concepts of operations 
(CONOPS) are proposed for integrating SABER and EPLRS. All options are based on 
the assumption that EPLRS units will continue operating with other EPLRS units 
according to already established protocols and that SABER units will communicate with 
other SABER units as previously established. 
1. Option 1: Collocation of SABER Beacon with EPLRS Radio Set 
The first option would be to collocate a SABER beacon with every EPLRS 
radio set. Every unit would then report via both systems. This would allow each unit to 
respond to every ITS message as well as maintain communications with the EPLRS Net 
Control Stations. Figure 9 shows this CONOP. 
This would be a simple, although costly and somewhat redundant, solution 
if EPLRS and SABER used the same position reference system. However, since SABER 
uses GPS and EPLRS uses MGRS, this solution could not be implemented without a 
software upgrade for either the EPLRS RSs or the SABER beacons. Additionally, since 
there is not a SABER beacon located at the NCS, it would require the RS user to be 
proficient in the operation of both systems and would place on the user the added burden 
of providing a timely response to both systems simultaneously. 
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Figure 9: EPLRS/SABER CONOP Option 1. 
2. Option 2: Collocation of SABER Beacon at EPLRS Net Control 
Station 
The second option is to place a SABER beacon at the EPLRS Net Control 
Station vice at the RSs. The RSs would report to the NCS, as they do now. The NCS 
would be configured to respond to individual SABER ITS messages based on all 
positional information currently available on the RSs connected to the NCS. It could be 
configured to provide either a generic Don't Shoot Me message based on the presence of 
RSs in the targeted area or a detailed response with unit identifications and exact 
positions. 
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To accomplish this, the NCS would require the capability of converting 
incoming EPLRS RS MGRS coordinates to latitude/longitude prior to responding to a 
SABER ITS message. This option would eliminate the redundant reporting by the RSs, as 
needed for Option 1. Figure 10 shows this CONOP. 
~E 
SABER BEACONS 
Figure 10: EPLRS/SABER CONOP Option 2. 
3. Option 3: Modify SABER C2Ts to Convert Coordinates 
A third option is to modify the SABER C2Ts to receive EPLRS positional 
information in MGRS coordinates, from either individual RSs or as a compilation from the 
NCS, and convert the positions to latitude/longitude prior to forwarding it to SABER-
equipped units. This would place the direct burden of responding to ITS messages on the 
C2Ts. The RSs or NCSs could be configured to provide routine updates of all EPLRS 
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units to the SABER C2Ts. The C2Ts could be programmed to provide either a generic 
DSM message based on the reported presence of friendly units in the targeted area or a 












Figure 11: EPLRS/SABER CONOP Option 3. 
4. Option 4: Super C2T 
The fourth option would requtre all SABER and EPLRS positional 
information to be passed to a common C2T. This "super C2T" would function as a 
situational awareness clearinghouse and compare all positional information from all 
sources. As with Option 3, this option could be configured in one of two ways. With the 
-first method, the NCS would forward data from its reporting RSs. With the second 
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method, individual RSs would be linked to the C2T as well as to their NCS. Upon receipt 
of an ITS message from a SABER-equipped unit, this super C2T could respond with a 
basic positive/negative report indicating the presence of any friendly units in the targeted 
area. It could also be programmed to provide unit identification and positional 
information of the units in this area. Figure 12 shows this CONOP. 
While this might be a good option for conducting post-event analysis and 
for relaying a snapshot of the battlespace up the chain of command, it would probably not 






Figure 12: EPLRS/SABER CONOP Option 4. 
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C. RECOMMENDED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The largest issue involved with integrating SABER and EPLRS is determining 
what coordinate system will be used. The best long term SABER-EPLRS solution is to 
embed a GPS receiver into each EPLRS radio set and modify EPLRS to use standard 
latitude/longitude coordinates. This, however, is a costly undertaking. Until it happens, 
we must look at the best way to convert from the MGRS coordinates used by EPLRS to 
the latitude/longitude coordinates used by SABER 
Based on the pros and cons of each option discussed above, Option 3 appears to 
be the best solution. It is far easier and much less costly to modify the SABER C2Ts to 
perform the function of coordinate system conversion than it would be to modify the 
already fielded EPLRS radio sets and net control stations. 
1. EPLRS to SABER Data Flow 
Since EPLRS RSs communicate via line of sight with their NCSs, but are 
most likely not within LOS of the SABER C2T, the most sensible solution is for the NCSs 
to transmit the positional updates to the SABER C2T. The NCSs should compile and 
forward an update of the locations, in MGRS coordinates, of all EPLRS-equipped units to 
the SABER C2T in accordance with a pre-established schedule. Additionally, the NCS 
should be able to provide updates as requested by the C2T. The C2T should be 
configured to convert MGRS coordinates to latitude/longitude coordinates prior to 
responding to a SABER beacon's ITS message. The C2T can be programmed to provide 
several different types of responses to an ITS message. It can send a message that says 
(1) it's okay to shoot - there are no friendly units within the targeted area, (2) there are 
friendly units within the intended targeted area (a generic DSM message), or (3) friendly 
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units are located at latitude/longitude (a standard specific DSM message). The SABER-
equipped unit can then take action accordingly. Figure 13 portrays the data flow for this 
envisioned CONOPS. 
1. EPLRS RSs relay position to NCS. 
2. NCS forwards summary ofRS positions to SABER C2T. 
3. SABER C2T converts RS positions from MGRS to tat/long. 
4. SABER C2T responds to SABER beacon ITS messages in 
one of three ways: 
- It's okay to shoot - there are no friendlies in targeted area. 
- Don't Shoot - there are friendlies in the targeted area. 
- Don't Shoot- the following friendlies are in the targeted area 
1 
at lat/long. 





Figure 13: Recommended CONOPS: EPLRS to SABER Data Flow. 
2. SABER to EPLRS Data Flow 
To enable the EPLRS-equipped units to have the same overall picture of 
the battlefield as the SABER-equipped units, the SABER C2T should also be configured 
to convert the latitude and longitude coordinates received from the SABER beacons to 
MGRS coordinates. It can then relay the positions of SABER-equipped units to the 
EPLRS NCSs for further relay to the RSs. Figure 14 portrays this data flow. 
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1. SABER beacons transmit their positions to C2T. 
2. C2T converts beacon positions from lat/long to MGRS. 
3. C2T relays beacon positions to EPLRS NCS. 
4. NCS relays SABER positions to RSs. 
N C S f--------J 
4 3 2 
SABER 
BEACONS 
Figure 14: Recommended CONOPS: SABER to EPLRS Data Flow. 
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VII. INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
CONOPS 
The projected cost of SABER is $5K per unit. The projected cost of EPLRS is 
$30-40K per unit. [Ref 13] Based on these numbers alone, it can be argued that the 
ultimate combat identification solution is to cancel EPLRS and install a SABER beacon on 
every tank, aircraft, and ship. However, the services must look beyond these numbers and 
determine the exact requirements. SABER and EPLRS are only two pieces of the combat 
identification/situational awareness equation. Other CID systems currently in use/under 
development, such as those discussed in Chapter IV, must also be considered. There may 
not be a need for both SABER and Combat Track. Or, there may be a requirement to 
integrate SABER with PLRS as well as EPLRS to capitalize on the efforts already made 
to integrate PLRS with JMCIS. [Ref 19] 
The services must take a hard look at all of these systems and determine the best 
way to provide the current tactical picture to the front-line tactical units, joint task force 
commanders and remotely located commanders. They need to determine exactly who 
needs the information and how often it really needs to be updated. In other words, are 
near-real time information updates actually required for everyone? Additionally, while the 
services must ensure the warfighters have all the information required to make tactical 
decisions, they must also look at the ramifications of providing them too much 
information. Creating an information overload can create confusion and be as detrimental 
as not providing enough information. 
55 
Once the actual combat identification/situational awareness requirements are 
determined, the services must look at the communications infrastructure needed to 
support them. Near-real time updates require dedicated, jam-proof communications links. 
While integrating SABER and EPLRS goes a long way toward answering combat 
identification needs, this combination will not work without the communications 
architecture to support it. SABER has been designed to utilize FL TSATCOM, however, 
there is a limit to the number of communications channels that can be provided by the 
satellites currently in orbit. Other communications options, including the use of 
MILST AR and the costly option of placing more satellites in orbit, must be explored. 
If the goal is to completely integrate all of the situational awareness systems, 
CONOP Option 4: Super-C2T (discussed in Chapter IV) must be given serious 
consideration. This Super-C2T could provide the common gateway needed to allow the 
exchange of CID information from a variety of systems. Since the AN/KSQ-1 Block 1 
upgrade planned for FY 97 will integrate the amphibious assault direction finding system 
with PLRS and JMCIS [Ref 19], thus answering the question ofhow to convert from GPS 
coordinates to MGRS coordinates, JMCIS should be considerd for the role of Super-C2T. 
Figure 15 depicts a CONOPS encompassing the situational awareness systems and 
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Figure 15: Situational Awareness Systems CONOPS. 
With this architecture, all combat identification/situational awareness systems are 
linked to JMCIS. JMCIS would then act as a clearinghouse, converting MGRS 
coordinates to latitude and longitude, and vice versa. It would provide each CID/SA 
system access to the databases of all other CID/SA systems. This architecture would 
allow any JMCIS-linked command to obtain a quick view of any aspect of the battlefield. 
It would greatly increase the commander's knowledge and facilitate a timely, better-
informed response to changing battlefield conditions. 
Combat identification and situational awareness systems cannot be created in a 
vacuum. With the joint requirements and budget constraints of today, these systems must 
be designed to be interoperable with current systems as well as with other systems under 
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development. Program managers must have firsthand knowledge of programs and efforts 
similar to their own programs and must take the initiative to ensure that time and money 
are not wasted on duplicate programs. Better lines of communications must be 
established between the services and between various commands and organizations within 
the same service. Commanders and warfighters need a common operational picture of the 
battlefield. The integration of SABER and EPLRS is a major step toward achieving this 
goal. 
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APPENDIX A: FREQUENCY DEFINITIONS 
Signals used for satellite communications are normally in the UHF, SHF and VHF 
frequency ranges. Unlike HF and lower frequencies, UHF, SHF and VHF signals 
propagate along straight-line paths and are virtually unaffected by the ionosphere. [Ref 
20, p.233] SABER and EPLRS both use UHF frequencies. The table below summarizes 
the radio frequency spectrum. 
ELF Extremely Low Frequency 30Hz-300Hz 
VF Voice FreQuency 300Hz-3kHz 
VLF Very Low FreQuency 3kHz-30kHz 
LF Low Frequency 30 kHZ - 300 kHz 
MF Medium Frequency 300 kHz - 3 MHz 
HF High FreQuency 3 MHz- 30 MHz 
VHF Very High FreQuency 30 MHz - 300 MHz 
UHF Ultra High FreQuency 300 MHz - 3 GHz 
SHF Super High Frequency 3 GHz- 30 GHz 
EHF Extremely High Frequency 30 GHz - 300 GHz 
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APPENDIX B: DATA LINKS 
There are a number of different data links used to relay tactical information 
between ships, aircraft and shore nodes. One of the issues involved with integrating 
SABER and EPLRS is determining how the CID data will be passed over these links. The 
table below [from Ref 20] lists the characteristics and uses of common tactical data links. 
NATO u.s. Data Rate Frequency Use 
Format Designation & Band 
Format 
Link 1 TADIL B 2.4 kbps landline air defense 
Link4A TADILC 5 kbps UHF aircraft data 
system 
Link 11 TADILA 2.25 kbps HF NTDS 
Link 14 TADILA 75 bps HF/UHF NTDS 
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APPENDIX D: ACQUISITION CATEGORIES AND 
MILESTONE DECISION AUTHORITIES 
ACAT SELECTION CRITERIA DESIGNATION AUTHORITY MILESTONE 
DECISION 
AUTHORITY 
I A program not classified as Under Secretary of Defense ACAT I D- Under 
highly sensitive by the Secretary (Acquisition) Secretary of Defense 
of Defense that has been (Acquisition) 
designated as an ACAT I ACAT I D - Under Secretary 
program or has been estimated ACAT I C- DoD 
by the Under Secretary to require ACAT I C - Component Head Component Head or, if 
an eventual expenditure of more delegated, the DoD 
than $300 million for RDT&E or Component 
more than $1. 8 billion for Acquisition Executive 
procurement (measured in FY 
1990 constant dollars). 
II 
A program not meeting the DoD Component Head or, if DoD Component Head 
criteria for ACA T I that has been delegated, the DoD or, if delegated, the 
designated by the DoD Component Acquisition DoD Component 
Component Head as an ACAT II Executive Acquisition Executive 
program or is estimated to 
require an eventual expenditure 
of more than $115 million for 
RDT&E or more than $540 
million for procurement 
(measured in FY 1990 constant 
dollars). 
Ill Programs not meeting criteria for DoD Component Acquisition Lowest level deemed 
ACAT I and ACA T II that have Executive appropriate by the 
been designated ACA T Ill by the designation authority 
DoD Component Acquisition 
Executive. 
IV All other acquisition programs for DoD Component Acquisition Lowest level deemed 
which the milestone decision Executive appropriate by the 
authority should be delegated to designation authority 
a level below that required for 
ACATIII. 
[After Ref. 30 , p. 2-3] 
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APPENDIX E: ACRONYM LIST 
Acquisition Category 
Army Digitization Master Plan 
Airborne Power Adapter 
All Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
Binary Phase Shift Keying 
Command and Control 
Command, Control and Intelligence 
Command and Control Terminal 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
Command Display Terminal 
Circular Error Probable 
Combat Identification 
Common Operating Environment 
Concept of Operations 
Defense Data Network 
Don't Shoot Me 
Digital Signal Processor 
Electronic Counter Countermeasures 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 
Effective Radiated Power 
European Command 
Frequency Division Multiple Access 
Future Digital Radio 
Forward Error Correction 
Friendly Identification 
Fleet Satellite Communications 
Frequency Shift Keying 
General Officer Steering Group 
Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
Identification Friend or Foe 
Information Systems Control 
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center 
Joint Maritime Command Information System 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
Joint Tactical Information Data System 
Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 
Line of Sight 
Low Probability of Detection 
Low Probability of Interception 
Local Situational Awareness 

































Military Grid Reference System 
Military Identification 
Military Satellite Communications 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment 
Navigation Aid 
Network Control Station 
Naval Command Tactical System - Afloat 
Over the Air Rekeying 
Officer in Tactical Command Information Communications System 
Over the Horizon 
Predesignated Item 
PLRS Communications Enhancement 
Position Location Reporting System 
Radio Frequency Interference 
Radio Set 
Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply 
Situational Awareness Data Link 
Satellite Communications 
Spherical Error Probable 
Situational Report 
Systems Control 
To Be Determined 
Tactical Decision Aid 
Time Division Multiple Access 
Tactical Exploitation ofNational Capabilities 
Tactical Internet 
Target Identification 
Time of Arrival 
Tactical Packet Network 
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